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Abstract 
This paper studies the distribution within marriage with divorce and remar-
riage considerations. In a pool of individuals, a male and a female are randomly 
paired up to form a marriage partnership to play an infinitely repeated Nash 
demand game. Incompatible demands lead to an unsuccessful marriage and a 
higher probability of divorce. In case of dissolution, the two individuals return 
to the pool and get an outside option payoff until remarriage. There is a vast 
multiplicity of equilibria. Using the evolutionary stable equilibrium selection 
criterion, there is a unique stochastically stable division, which converges to 
an asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution with the power as the ratio of the 













I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Li Duozhe, for 
his constant guidance and encouragement, since I was an undergraduate. His 
trust provides me with the freedom to explore my interest in marriage, related 
or seemingly unrelated to this thesis. I also thank the two internal examiners, 
Professor Wong Kam-Chau and Professor Ke Rongzhu, and an anonymous 
external examiner, for their useful comments. 
I am grateful to all the staff in the Department of Economics, especially 
Maureen and Christine of the Graduate Division, for their warmth and sup-
port. 
I also sincerely appreciate the Department of Statistics for my undergrad-
uate training, and my friends there for their alignment and helpful discussions 
on the purpose of education and the meaning of life in these two years. I am 
pleased to be given valuable opportunities by the Chung Chi College to par-
ticipate in her service-learning programme, in which I learnt "the fruit of love 
is service, and the fruit of service is peace." 
Lastly, I dedicate my thesis to Vivian. I feel truly indebted to her. I re-






1 Introduction 1 
2 Literature Review 4 
2.1 Iritra-Marriage Bargaining 4 
2.2 Evolutionary Analysis of Bargaining Models 6 
3 The Model 8 
3.1 Equilibrium 9 
4 Equlibrium Selection 15 
4.1 Convergence 18 
4.2 Mistake and Experimentation 19 
4.3 Nash Bargaining Solution 26 
5 Heterogeneous Popoluations 30 





The study of the gain and distribution within marriage was pioneered by Becker 
(1991). In this neoclassical model, he assumes that husbands and wives would 
jointly maximize an implicit household utility subject to the pooled resource 
constraint, before the marital surplus is distributed. The gain of marriage 
arises from the specialization and the complementarities in the household pro-
duction, in which the time and good inputs are substituted according to their 
own prices in equilibrium. The distribution within marriage is determined both 
extra-household and intra-household. In an efficient marriage market, where 
costless, enforceable, and binding contracts could be made, both who marries 
whom arid the distribution within marriages are determined in the market 
bccausc of efficient assortative inatchirig of partners. In the iritra-household 
perspective, an altruist, whose utility function consists of the utility functions 
of the other household members, would confront them with take-it-or-leave-it 
offer to determine the distribution for the household. Efficiency is attained 
regardless of who makes the decision. 
Meanwhile, there are empirical findings against the pooled income assump-
tion, for example, Phipps and Burton (1998) provides evidence the household 
consumption pattern is affected by the income shares of the spouses, less malo-
related goods such as tobacco and alcohol were consumed relatively, while 
the expenditure was shifted to female-related consumption including women's 
clothing arid children health spending, as the income share of the wife in-
creased. Individual control over intra-household resource and the gender roles 
are decisive to the distribution within marriage. 
The bargaining framework is therefore introduced. Different bargaining 
protocols are used to model the interaction between husbands and wives. 
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Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Homey (1981) were the seminal 
contributions for the cooperative approach. They adopt the Nash Bargaining 
Solution (1950) to pin down a unique pair of shares from the household pro-
duction, with the "threat point" chosen as the utility of remaining single or 
of getting divorced. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) challenge the divorce-threat 
assumption by their "separate spheres" bargaining model. The threat point is 
internalized as the non-cooperative equilibrium within an unhappy marriage, 
in which the spouses arrange their own consumption and associated public 
goods separately. They show individual resources are relevant to the distribu-
tion within marriage, and the non-neutrality of the two public goods reflects 
the gender roles. In their companion paper (1994), they explore the possibility 
to include the creation, maintainence, and enforcement of gender roles and 
social norms to study marriage behaviour, in additional to the choice of the 
threat point. 
In this paper, we depart from the previous literatures by considering the 
effect of divorce and remarriage. According to Cherlin (1992), despite different 
estimates were computed, it is evident that half of all marriages would end in 
a separation or a divorce. Remarriages have been common as well. About 
two-thirds of divorced women and three-fourths of divorced men remarried. 
The divorce rate for remarriages is similar to first marriages. Previous liter-
atures discuss how the threat point should be chosen between inside options 
(i.e. unhappy marriage) and outside options (i.e. divorce). Nevertheless, the 
Pareto Optimal Axiom of the Nash Bargaining Soution excludes the possibil-
ity of their exercise because the solution shares outweigh them. We hold an 
alternative view that divorce is not only used as a threat, but also an event 
that could happen. Consequently, the possibility of remarriage should also be 
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considered when the event of divorce happens. We model the likelihood of 
such event as the risk of breakdown in probability of the marriage partnership. 
Miithoo (1999) provides detailed distinctions of inside options, outside options 
arid the risk of breakdown under the bargaining framework. In general, this 
probabilistic risk is increasing with the incompatibility of the partners, but 
we also reserve the possibility of dissolution even for successful marriages, for 
instance, due to the death of one spouse. Since divorce is possible to hap-
pen, the different probabilities of remarriage of the spouses become relevant 
as the source of the bargaining power within marriage, which is discussed in 
Pollak (1994). Based on Young (1993b), we select the equilibrium under the 
evolutionary stability. There is a unique stochastically stable division, which 
converges to an asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution. The bargaining power 
is found to be the ratio of their probabilities of remarriage, as the spouses 
arc sufficiently pationt and the risk of breakdown for compatible marriages is 
close to zero. This finding suggests that when divorce is becoming common, 
its consequences such as the ability to remarry should be considered in the 
distribution within marriage not only as a threat point but also as a source 
of bargaining power for the current marriages. The rest of the paper is orga-
nized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review. Section 3 presents the 
model and shows a vast multiplicity of equilibria. Section 4 derives the unique 
stochastically stable division and the asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution. 
Section 5 extends the model to heterogenous populations. Section 6 summaries 
and discusses the implications. Detailed proofs are in the Appendix. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Intra-Marriage Bargaining 
In an inefficient marriage market, agreements could neither be binding nor cost-
lessly enforceable, bargaining could happen not only prior to, but also within 
marriage. In Becker's altruist model, each household member is offered and 
receives more than his or her own reservation utility (e.g. when single or out 
of the household) in equilibrium. The resulting distribution within household 
is the one that maximizes the altruist's utility function, which consists of the 
utility functions of the other household members, subject to the household's 
resource constraint. The household member whom the altruist more "cares 
about" would receive a larger share. While this result is apparently intuitive, 
the postulate of the presence of an altruist to make offers is criticizable. This 
position reflects the bargaining power derived from being the proposer to make 
offers which are able to confront the other household members. The source 
of this power is not explained. Pollak (1994) provides a discussion about the 
role of bargaining power in the distribution within marriage. In our model, by 
considering, the ofFoct of divorce and remarriage, wo argue that the bargaining 
power might come from the probability of remarriage. 
Another type of bargaining models applies the Nash Bargaining Solution 
(1950) to pin down the division of the marital surplus subject to a threat point. 
Consequently, the solution of the intra-marriage distribution depends on both 
the bargaining set of pooled family resource and individual control of resources 
at the threat point. The choice of the threat point reflects the relevance of the 
outcome in the absence of agreement. Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy 
and Homey (1981) locate the threat point as the value of divorce, while Limd-
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berg and Pollak (1993) consider a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage 
as an alternative. McElroy (1990) resorts the position of the threat point is 
shaped by "extra-household environmental parameters" such as labour market 
situation, legal structure, government transfer to individual, etc. 
Unlike the Nash Bargaining Solution, noncooperative bargaining models do 
not rely on several axioms to obtain Pareto efficiency, but it is sometimes at-
tained in some equilibria. For example, Lundberg and Pollak (1994) sketched a 
noncooperative infinitely repeated game of a single household public good con-
tribution. In every period, the two spouses have to allocate their incomes be-
tween their own private consumption and the public good contribution. When 
punishment threats are credible, the Pareto optimal equilibrium could be sus-
tained; otherwise the public good could be under-provided. We follow the idea 
to model the interaction between the spouses within marriage by an infinitely 
repeated game. However, the stage game is chosen as the Nash demand game 
(1953) for two reasons. First, it allows us to measure the degree of the incom-
patibility between the spouses, which is proportional to the risk of breakdown 
of the marriage. Second, the previous literatures assume the gain of marriage, 
in the form of a larger joint consumption set or the public goods, is ready to be 
bargained. We hold an alternative view that the marital surplus is realized for 
bargaining only when the marriage is compatible in the Nash demand game. 
Thus, the incompatibility of one stage game both reduces the marital surplus 
for bargaining arid increases the risk of breakdown of the current period. 
5 
2.2 Evolutionary Analysis of Bargaining Models 
Despite compatible marriages are favourable to both spouses, the distribu-
tion within marriage remained unsettled. In reality, we could observe different 
distributions. Likewise, there are usually multiple equilibria in noncoopera-
tive bargaining models, especially those involve repeated games. While Kreps 
(1990) suggests there seems to be a "self-evident way to play" to describe the 
conventional mode of behaviour as a "focal-point equilibrium" in realistic so-
cial context, evolutionary analysis becomes considerably a sensible equilibrium 
selection criterion for bargaining games with multiple equilibria. For example, 
Ti'oger (2000), and Ellingsen and Robles (2002) use stochastic stability as the 
solution concept to select the equilibrium without underinvestment in the hold-
up problem. 
The stochastic evolution was first studied by Kandori et al. (1993), Young 
(1993a) and Young (1993b). In Kandori et al. and Young (1993a), the popula-
tions are subject to survival competitive pressures in their neighbourhood due 
to adaptation and random mutation; while in Young (1993b), the individuals 
learn this adaptation from their precedents and make their best response sub-
ject to random perturbation. The stochastically stable strategies are those the 
most resistant to the random mutation or perturbation. In this view, the social 
norm arises because the bargainers' expectations are shaped by their prece-
dents when other information is limited. As a result, the transition of the 
precendents' actions to the future bargainers might favour some social norms 
to evolve and maintain. We follow his idea and explore the possibility to model 
the formation and the maintenance of the social norm of marriage by adaptive 
play. In the context of marriage, we suggest intuitively that new spouses could 
rely on the experience of the marriages of their parents or relatives to learn 
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how to interact with one another. Literatures from other relevant disciplines 
including sociology and psychology reinforce the same phenomenon. See, for 
example, S ant rock (2005) and DeVault (1991); the latter provides qualitative 
description and explanation of how girls develop their gender role as female 
from their mothers and pass along to their children when they become mothers. 
Ill our model, we propose the convention of the distribution within marriage 
as the social norm of marriage. Despite this distribution might evolve differen-
tially over time, the generically stable convention is the division of the marital 
surplus most frequently observed in the long rim. We select this as a plausible 
equilibrium under evolutionary stability. 
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3 The Model 
Consider two large finite classes of males and females M and F , some players 
of each class are single while some are married. One male m from M and 
one female f from the class F are drawn at random and paired up to form a 
marriage partnership when they are both single. In this marriage partnership, 
they expect to play a discrete-time infinitely repeated Nash demand game. 
Specifically, in every period, m and f make their demands x and y simultane-
ously. They could get according to their demands when they are compatible, 
otherwise they get the "residual" of their partner's demand. That is, m and f 
get the shares x and y respectively, if re + y < 1, and m gets I — y and f gets 
1 - x, if a: + y > 1. 
In every period, after the shares are realized, there are two possibilities of 
breakdown, m and f could choose to dissolve the partnership. Even though 
they don't, there is still a probability 9 {x, y) of breakdown. This probabilis-
tic risk of breakdown captures the incompatibility in a partnership. More 
specifically, 
f 
e a: + 2/ < 1 ^ (a：，y) = for I a(a: -h y — 1) -t 6 x -i-y > 1 
where a(-) is strictly increasing over (0’ 1) with the boundary conditions o^(0)= 
0 and a ( l ) < 1 - e. The more incompatible the marriage partnership is, the 
higher is the probabilistic risk of breakdown. In case of dissolution, the two 
players return to single and wait for matching again, m and f have different 
probabilities of remarriage pi and p2 (subscript 1 for m and 2 for f hereafter) 
respectively. Since these probabilities might differ, we allow inflow and outflow 
of players in the two classes, such that there are sufficient players in each class 
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to match according to these probabilities. When staying single, m and f get 
bi and 62 in every period respectively. It is assumed that 61+62 < 1，i.e. there 
is some surplus for the marriage partnership. 
We assume each class is homogenous, that is, all players in each class has 
the same remarriage probability Pi, payoff while being single bi, and von Neu-
mann Morgenstern utility function Ui(-). We shall extend to heterogeneous 
populations in Section 5. We also assume m's utility function ui{-) and / ' s 
utility function W2(.) are both continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly con-
cave in their own shares respectively. In addition, we assume both classes have 
the same discount factor 5 for simplicity. 
3.1 Equilibrium 
We show there is vast multiplicity of stationary equilibria. By stationarity, 
we mean the players make the same demand in every period in the marriage 
partnership. It is considered as a habit within marriage. In a marriage, there 
is a probability of 1 —没(x, y) to continue the marriage to the next period; while 
when beng single, there is also a probability of 1 - for i = 1, 2 to remain 
single in the next period. The transition could take place in the form of the 
breakdown of the marriage with a probability 9 (x, y), and also remarriage with 
a probability pi. We split into two cases: x y < 1 ^0T compatible marriages 
and x-\-y > I ioT incompatible marriages. For x + y < 1, m would get his own 
demand x in every period. When x < bi^ m would choose to divorce. This is 
same for f when y < 62- While for x + y > 1, m would get the residual of his 
partner 's demand 1 — y in every period, because the demands are incompatible. 
When 1 — y < 61, m would again choose to divorce. This is same for f when 
1 - a: < &2. 
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Ui(-\) payoff "i(hi) per pcri(xl 
Figure 1: A Graphical Illustration of the Transition Process 
Let Vi {x, y) be the utility in a marriage for player i = 1,2, from the aforemen-
tioned recursive nature, we could write 
Vi (x, y) = ui (x) -\-{l-e {x, y)) x bVi (x, y) ^ 9 (x, y) x 
' ^ u i ( 6 1 ) + p i X ( x , 2 / ) + ( l - p i ) x 
； ( 6 1 ) + P i X X ；•• 
二 � + (1 — 没州 c m + ^ y) r 二 1 二；广)-
Similarly, 
/ � — [(5没{x,y)]u2{b2) + [1 - + Sp2]u2(y) 
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Figure 2: A Graphical Illustration of the Transition Process 
By similar arguments, except the share x is replaced by the residual 1 - y, we 
could obtain 
V ( � [x,y)\u,[h) + [1 - ^ + 6p,]u,(l — y) 
工’ = ( 1 ( . , , ) ] ⑶ 
V ( � [卵[x, y)]u2[h2) + [1 - ^ + h2]u2[l - x) 
From equations (1) to (4), it is possible to define the lifetime average utility 
for the two players as Ut (x, y) = (1 - Vi (x, y) for i = 1,2. Specifically, 
J wi {x,y)ui[h{) + [1 - u；! (x,y)] Ui(a:) x ^ y < l Ui (x,y) = for 
{x,y)ui(hi) + [1 - li；! (a：,?/)] Ui(l - y) x + y>\ 
\ 
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� f W2 (x, y) 1^2(62) + [1 - [x, y)] U2{y) ^ x + y<l 
工’ = < for 
[W2 (x, y) ^ 2(62) + [1 - 1^ 2 (x, y)] U2{1 - x) x-^y>l 
where 
魂》、—S 二 f s n x , y ) 
The function Wi (x, y) could be thought as the fraction of lifetime associ-
ated with staying single. During this time, player i could get the share bi in 
every period. The remaining fraction of lifetime 1-Wi (x, y) is associated with 
the marriage, in which player i could get his or her own demand when the 
demands are compatible, otherwise he or she could get only the "residual" of 
their partner 's demand. It is seen that wi (x, y) is strictly increasing in 6 (x, y) 
(thus e) but strictly decreasing in pi. A higher probabilistic risk of break-
down would result in quicker turnovers of marriage, and therefore shorten the 
fraction of lifetime associated with the marriage. While a lower probability 
of remarriage would directly lengthen the fraction of lifetime associated with 
staying single. It follows that the lifetime average utility Ut {x, y) is a convex 
combination of the utilities between the share bi when being single and the 
share in the marriage, with the weight as the fraction of lifetime associated 
with these two states. 
Following from the properties of 9 {x, y) (and a{x y - 1))，we could es-
tablish L e m m a 1 for some properties of Wi (cc,y), which are useful in the 
subsequent sections. 
Lemma 1 For z = 1,2, 
(i) Wi (x, y) is continuous but NOT differentiable 8it x + y = 1 
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(ii) Wi (x, y) = Wi y') for all demand pairs {x, y) and (工‘’y') such that 
x + y = x' + y'>l 
(iii) Wi (x, 1 - x) is constant of x 
Proof: 
Part (i) is due to the inequality of the left and right derivatives of Q (x, y) at 
X -{- y = 1, because 0；(工 + y — 1) is strictly increasing for a: + y > 1 only. 
Specifically, the left derivative of 9 (x, y) at 工 + y = 1 is zero but the right 
derivative is non-zero. Let q'(0) be the right derivative of cv(-) at 0. 
lim 字 二 lim 学 
x+y4.1 ax x+yil ay 
because q:(.) has the argument x + y-1, which is linear in both x and y. This 
proves Part (ii) too. Part (iii) is due to the fact that in any pairs of compatible 
demands,没（a:，1 — a:) 二 e, which is constant of x. Q.E.D. 
It follows from Lemma 1 that in any compatible demand pairs, i.e. x-\-y = 
1，where x > bi and y > 62, both players would have no incentive to over-
demand because they would get the same shares within marriage but increase 
the probabilistic risk of breakdown 6 (x, y). This leads to a lower fraction of 
lifetime associated with the marriage, in which they could get more than bi. 
Hence, if both players coordinate well to form a happy marriage, they would 
not deviate, because the miscoordination might result in a dissolution with a 
higher probability. 
T h e o r e m 1 For any x G (61,1 - 62), the profile of stationary demand pairs 
(x, 1 — x) is an equilibrium. 
Proof: Clearly, in equilibrium, x+y must be at least 1, otherwise either player 
could increase his or her share to such that x-\-y — 1 but without increasing the 
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probabilistic risk of breakdown 9 (x, y). Also, x >bi and y > 62, otherwise the 
players would choose to leave the marriage. In addition, given the partner's 
demand x, player f would best-response 1 - a:. Any increment would not 
increase her share in the marriage, but would increase the probabilistic risk of 
breakdown 9 (x, y) because the demands become incompatible. Consequently, 
W2 (x, y) would increase to lower her lifetime average utility U2 (x, y). A similar 
converse argument is also true for player m. As a result, their best-responses 
correspond to a compatible marriage. Q.E.D. 
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4 Equlibrium Selection 
Since there are multiple equilibria within marriage, we hope to select some 
plausible ones under evolutionary stability. We study the distribution of mar-
riages of different generations. Marriage partners of the current generation 
observe the distribution of the previous generations to form an expectation 
and best-response. We interpret the term "generation" in a broad sense. The 
marriage partner of the last generation is not necessarily their "parents", but 
could be any marriages which provide relevant information to the marriage 
partners of the current generation. For instance, these could be the marriages 
of their siblings or relatives, or friends in their kin-network. 
Follwing Young (1993b), the bargaining process has the following structure. 
In each generation t = 1 ,2 , . . . ’ one male m from M and one female f from F 
are drawn respectively to form a marriage partnership. They expect to play an 
infinitely repeated Nash demand game. For technical reasons, we assume that 
there are a finite number of feasible divisions, and let D be the set of feasible 
divisions of A-uriit in 1 - 62). Denote the history up to and including gen-
eration t as the sequence ((x'^.y^), , . . . ’ In generation i + 1， 
another pair of m and f is drawn. Neither of them has prior knowledge or 
beliefs about the utility function, outside option, and remarriage probability 
of their partner. They rely on the information from their precendents of the 
same gender to decide what to demand. Formally, each m samples ki items 
from the last I records, i.e. s = ’ 
to form a (subjective) sample cumulative distribution of the demand made 
by f as G{y) = g/ki if there are exactly g demands made by the precedent 
f smaller than or equal to y in this sample. We assume for each generation 
15 
L both players consider their lifetime utilities Ui (x, y) for i — 1,2. Thus, m 
believes his expected lifetime utility for making the demand x given G{-) is 
U, (x, 1 — x) G{1 — + 广 ( A (x, y) dG{y) 
Jl-X 
Hence, m chooses a:计i that maximizes this expected lifetime utility. If there 
several feasible values for :c(+i，then m chooses each of them with positive 
probability. Similarly, each f samples /c2 items from s. 
Their response rule forms a stationary Markov process with the finite state 
space S consisting of all sequences s of length whose elements are the de-
mand pairs (x,y) e D x D. Let ri(a;|5) and r2{y\s) be the best reply con-
ditional distributions given the state s, that is, ri(a:|s) > 0 if and only if 
x is a best reply by m to a sample of size ki drawn from s; similarly for 
r2(y|2) by / . It is assumed that these distributions are stationary over gener-
ations. The bargaining process starts at the generation t = I at some initial 
state s � . In each subsequent generation, one male m from M and one fe-
male f from F are drawn respectively to form a marriage partnership. Each 
pair of m from M and f from F has a positive probability tt (m, / ) to be 
drawn, though it is not necessary the same probability for all pairs. Therefore, 
it gives no restrictions on assortative matching; some players could be more 
likely to be paired up. The samples need not be drawn with the same prob-
ability as well; recent samples could be more likely to be drawn than older 
samples. Given a state s = ((：？；卜‘+！’ �)，(t…+2’ ’... ’（工t’ 以t)) 
at generation t, the bargaining process proceeds to the successor state s'= 
卜⑷’ , ’ … ’ { x \ y ' ) ， a t generation t + 1 
with the transition probability 
Pss' = E + J ) � 严 丨 S ) 
m£M feF 
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and Pss' = 0 if s' is not a successor of s. This Markov process Pss> is de-
fined as the (unperturbed) evolutionary bargaining process of with precision 
A, rncmcory /，information parameters {ki/l, k2/l} and best reply conditional 
distributions {n(.|«s)，r2(.|s)} in Young (1993b). 
generation 
I 1 t - 1 + 1 
I 1 ; 
ki records 丨 ‘ k] records 
are sampled 丨 | are sampled 
‘ ‘ last I 
j I records 
I 1 
I 1 • 
I 1 •： 
I 1 t : l 
I 1 丄 t 
h 1 i + i 
Figure 3: A Graphical Illustration of the Evolutionary Bargaining Process 
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4.1 Convergence 
It is possible to observe the same distribution within marriage over generations. 
We shall show a convention must arise in the unperturbed Markov process 
Pss' when the sampling is sufficiontly incomplete, and evory convention is an 
absorbing state of this process. 
Definit ion 1 A state is a convention if it consists of some fixed division 
(x, 1 - x), where x e D, repeated for I times in succession. It is denoted 
as X . 
Defini t ion 2 For every x e D, the x-basin is the set of all states from which 
the unperturbed Markov process Pss' converges to the convention x with a pos-
itive probability. 
L e m m a 2 Every convention x is an absorbing state of the unperturbed Markov 
process Pss' • 
Proof: Suppose at generation t > I, the process Pss' is in the convention x, 
and in generation 亡 + 1, m G M and / G F are drawn to form a marriage 
partnership. In every possible sample drawn by / , the precedent m's always 
demand x; while in every possible sample drawn by m, the precendent / ' s 
always demand 1 — x. Since x G (6i, 1 -⑷，/'s unique best reply is 1 - x; 
while m's unique best reply is x. Hence, the state remains in the convention 
X in generation t + 1. Q.E.D. 
L e m m a 3 If there are at least 21 players in each class who sample k < 1/2 
items, then the 'process Pss> converges almost surely to a convention x from 
any initial state 
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Proof: in the Appendix. 
It is necessary to have enough players in each class with sufficiently in-
complete sampling, though the lower bound might not be 1/2. Young (1993a) 
discusses the lower bound of convergence for a more general class of games. For 
our model, the bound 1/2 is sufficient to exclude the possibility that the mar-
riage partners of the current generation would continue to make incompatible 
demands if their precedents make incompatible demands .^ 
4.2 Mistake and Experimentation 
In this subsection, we introduce a perturbed process, in which the players 
might sometimes make mistakes or experiment with other demands which are 
not the best replies given the information. Specifically, let p^i be the prob-
ability that m experiments in any generation, and gi(:r|s) be the experiment 
conditional distribution given m is experimenting in the state 5； similarly let 
P72 be the corresponding probability and q2iy\s) be the experiment condi-
tional distribution for f . The parameter p controls the absolute probability 
of experimentation, while 71 and 72 determine the relative probabilities of ex-
perimentation between the two classes. It is assumed that 从 |s) is stationary 
and takes full support over D�for i — 1,2. With perturbations, a stationary 
Markov process is defined with the transition probability from a state s to the 
successor state s' 
PL' = [ ( 1 - P 7 2 ) ri(x\s) r2(i/|s) 
m£M f£F 
+ P 7 i ( l — "72) qi{x\s) r2(y|s) + ( 1 - fni)fn2 n(a: |s) q2{y\s) 
+一7172 qi{x\s) q2{y\s). 
^ Young (1993b) presents an example for illustration. 
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and 尸二/ 二 0 if is not a successor of s. This Markov process P : , is defined 
as the perturbed evolutionary bargaining process in Young (1993b). 
The perturbed Markov process P二，is irreducible and aperiodic because 
qi{'\s) is stationary and takes full support over Z), for i = 1,2. Since the state 
space S is finite, it follows that P二, is also strongly ergodic and has a unique 
stationary distribution ij/\ Denote the probability of 广at a state s as jj/;. 
With stochastic perturbations, there are no absorbing states. However, when 
the probability of these perturbations is sufficiently small, some conventions 
could be observed more frequently than the others. They are more resistant 
to the perturbations, and are called as stochastically stable conventions. We 
assume m and f sample (rational) fractions ai and a� from the last I records 
respectively, i.e. a^  = kijl for i = 1,2，where a^  is chosen such that ki is an 
integer for the choice of 1. 
Def in i t ion 3 A convention x is stochastically stable if limp_>o exists and is 
positive. It is generically stable if it is stochastically stable for all admissible I. 
Following Young (1993a) and Young (1993b), it is possible to characterize 
the stochastically stable conventions by computing the minimum resistance to 
moving from a convention x to a state in some other basin. It measures the 
difficulty to escape from x due to the stochastic perturbations. A convention 
is generically stable if and only if it has the maximum of such resistance, that 
is, it requires the maximum stochastic perturbations to drive it out of the 
convention. We give the following formal definitions. 
Suppose s is the state at generation t and s' is a successor of s at generation 
/, + 1, is a mistake if it is not a best reply by m to any sample of size ki 
drawn from s; similarly y'.+i is a mistake if it is not a best reply by f to any 
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sample of size hz drawn from s. 
The resistance R (s, s') is the minimum number of mistakes involved in the 
one-period transition from s to s'. Clearly, R (s, s') G {0,1,2}. Extending to 
any two states s^ and the resistance s^) is the least total number of 
mistakes in any sequence of one-period transition that leads from s^ to s^. 
For each convention x, an x-tree is a directed tree with root x. Every 
vertex of other convention x' + x, there is a unique directed path to x whose 
resistance is R x), and there are no cycles. The stochastic potential of the 
convention x is the least resistance among all x-trees. 
Following Theorem 2 of Young (1993b), suppose the stationary distribution 
of P二/ converges to fiP of 尸么，as —> 0, a convention x is stochastically 
stable with > 0 if and only if x has the minimun stochastic potential 
among all the conventions. Therefore, to characterize the generically stable 
convention, it suffices to compute the minimum resistance r�(工）to moving 
from the convention x to a state of some other basin, for each x e D. For 
sufficiently small A, it is possible to show the generically stable conventions 
would maximize r^(x). Lastly, we shall show there exists a unique generically 
stable convention x* as A ^ 0. 
For Rotational purposes, suppose the demands x made by m and y made 
by f are incompatible by nA units, where n is a positive integer, we define 
/ 产 A) 严 ： • ) V . G D (5) 
� ^ 1 - (5 + + 6a{nA) Ui{x + nA) - ui(x) � , 
. / A , ,� 5a{nl^) U2(y)-U2{b2) ^ � n fr\ 
少2 力 = + ^ + • + 刑 ^ D (6) 
Also, for any real number c, denote [c] as the least integer greater than or equal 
to c. 
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L e m m a 4 For every x E D, the minimum resistance to moving from x to a 
state in some other basin is [/ x rA(:c)]，where 
, � • / ( 02 (A, 1 - x) \ ( 1 � 
a ( 1 ^ 江 
' V l + 02 (n2A,62 + A)；' ^ (A,x) + l y ' j 
where n\ and n] are positive integers such that x — bi = {rii + 1)A and 
1 - b2 - X = (712 + 1)A, provided that (nA, x) and (j)2 (^A, y) are both 
increasing in n for all x e D and y £ D, where n is a positive integer. 
Proof: The assumptions over (5) and (6) are the sufficient conditions for 
the existence and the uniqueness of the generically stable convention. They 
measure the relative change of utility from over-demanding nA units with 
respect to the discount by the increase of the probabilistic risk of breakdown 
cv(nA). When (pi (nA, •) is increasing in n over D, for i = 1’2, it suggests 
that for compatible marriages, the relative gain in the probabilistic risk of 
breakdown is greater than the relative gain in utility from over-demanding. 
In this sense, the inertia staying in a convention decreases with the degree 
of incompatibility. When the partner over-demands (by mistake) more, one 
tends to move to a new convention more easily, since staying in the original 
convention would lead to a higher probabilistic risk of breakdown. 
Suppose the process is now in the convention x, to move from x to a state 
that is in some other basin, there must be a path of least resistance passing 
through some state such that (i) some m,s best reply to a sample a of size ki 
from such a state is not x, and/or (ii) some / ' s best reply to a sample a ' of size 
/c2 from such a state is not 1 - x\ where l/2> k = max {/ci, /C2}. Beginning at 
the convention x, without loss of generality, let there be a sucession of i < A; 
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mistakes x' made by m's in a row. There is a positive probability that f ^ E. 
would be drawn in the next k generations inclusively, and these / ' s would 
sample a ' , which consists oi k-i instances of x and i instances of and best-
reply y ^ 1 — a: in every of these k generations. Without further mistakes, 
the m e M drawn in these k generations would demand x according to the 
convention x. Thus, this establishes a run ^ = ((x, y)，…，{x, y)) in these k 
generations. Following Lemma 3 in the Appendix, with positive probability, 
the process would converge to the convention x. Suppose m has made two 
kinds of mistakes x' and x", the corresponding resistance is at least as the 
above, because along this alternative path f might sample a' which consists 
of some instances of x", her best-reply might sometimes be 1 - a:' or 1 - x". 
Thus, it might take more mistakes to establish a run. 
Hence, it suffices to compute the least number of initial mistakes x' • x 
made by m's or 1 - re' 1 - a: made by / ' s , which lead to the best-replies of 
their partners different from 1 — x ov x respectively. We consider two cases 
separately: x' < x and x' > x. We show in the Appendix that these numbers 
of mistakes are the four terms in 
We proceed by showing for sufficiently small A, the second and the third 
terms in bocomo largo relative to tho fourth and the first terms. Hence, 
it suffices to consider only the first and the fourth terms. 
From equations (5), as A approaches 0, 
" A r � = M A ) ui{x)-ui{hi) 
" ^ 1 � ’）— l - S + Spi-i-Se + Sa(A) ‘ Ui(x + A) - ui(x) 
1 - 6 -h Spi + 6e ' u [ � 
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while 
A L A� 6a{niA) uUbi + A) - 1x1(61) � 
01 (ni A, + 八）=1 — J + 咖 + & + J以 (几 l A ) . … _ 以 i ( � + A) 4 0 
because the first part remains finite regardless of the choice of A. 
Hence, for sufficiently small A, the second term in r^ ix ) is close to ai, 
which is larger than the fourth term as it is still less than ai. 
Similarly, from equations (6), as A approaches 0, 
S {A i - r ) = U2(l - x) - U2(b2) 
們 � ' ) — l - S + 6p2 + Sc. + Scx{A) ‘ U2{1 - x + A)- u^il - x) 
Sa'(0) U2(l - x) - U2(b2)�0 
1 - 6 6p2Se w'2(l — x) 
while 
� ) 1 - (5 + + d'e + 5a(n2A) ^2(1 - x) - 1^ 2(62 + A) 
because the first part also remains finite regardless of the choice of A. 
Hence, for sufficiently small A, the third term in r八� is close to a2, which 
is larger than the first term as it is still less than <22. 
Therefore, for sufficiently small A, it suffices to consider only the first and 
the fourth terms in 7"么(工).Since Ui{-) is strictly increasing, (f)i (A,x) is strictly 
increasing in x. Similarly, 02 (A, 1 - x) is strictly decreasing in x. Thus, the 
first term is strictly decreasing in x, while the fourth term is strictly increasing 
in X. It follows that the function r A � is the minimum of these two monotone 
functions, and is first strictly increasing in x and then strictly decreasing in x. 
On the set of possible divisions D, it achieves its maximum either at a unique 
value a;A or at two adjacent values x^ and x/^ + A. We shall show that these 
are the generically stable divisions, and that, as A -)> 0, they would converge 
to a unique generically stable division x*. 
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Lemma 5 For sufficiently small A, a division [x, 1 - a;) is generically stable 
if and only if x maximizes the function r/^(x) on D. 
Proof: Following Young (1993b), suppose r^(x) has a unique maximize x^, 
contruct an XA-tree Ta as follows: 
(i) for every x e D such that x < t a , put the directed edge (x, x + A) in Ta 
and let its resistance be I x ai (二丄冗j!)； 
(ii) for every x e D such that x > xa, put the directed edge (a:, a: - A) in Ta 
and let its resistance be I x a2 • 
In Ta, every vertex of other convention x' — x a has a uniqe outgoing edge. 
If X' is on the left of x a , then this outgoing edge is directed to its immediate 
neighbour on the right, vice versa. Thus, for every x', there is a unique directed 
path to Xa, whose resistance is constructed by choosing at each vertex the 
outgoing edge with the least resistance derived in rA{x). So Ta has the least 
resistance among all x^-trees. 
•——> 參 參——> 眷——> •——• > • ^  • <——• <——• ^ ——• 
Xa 
Figure 4: An XA-tree, 
We claim that Ta has also the least resistance among all x-trees. Let T be 
an x-tree for some division x ^ xa- Denote the resistance of Ta as r(T^) and 
that of T be r(T). In T, xa has a unique outgoing edge. Let the resistance of 
this edge be r. By L e m m a 4’ [/ x r/^{xA)] is the minimum resistance among 
all possible outgoing edges from XA, SO r > [/ X By construction, 
in Ta, [/ x r/\{x)] is the resistance of the unique outgoing edge from x. Also, 
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for every vertex x' different from both x a and x, the resistance of the unique 
outgoing edge from x' in Ta is no greater than that in T because the resistance 
in is constructed by choosing at each vertex the outgoing edge with the 
least resistance derived in r^ix)- Hence, r{T) > r(TA) + r - [/ x rA(x)]. Since 
Xa is a unique inaximizer of we have r > [l x r^i^A)] > x r^{x). 
It follows that r{T) > r{T^) as claimed. Hence, x^ is a stochastically stable 
convention for any choice of m. 
Ill case there are two adjacent maximizers x^ ^ and x a + A of construct 
a tree for each of them as above. Similar arguments would show that these 
trees have the least resistance among all x-trees. Hence, x^ and xa + A are 
stochastically stable conventions for any choice of m. As A -> 0，they converge 
to the same generically stable convention. 
4.3 Nash Bargaining Solution 
As A — 0，there is a unique maximizer of This divison x* corresponds 
to the unique generically stable convention x*. When the two classes have the 
same information, i.e. ai = a2, we could further characterize x* as an asym-
metric Nash Bargaining Solution with the bargaining powers being strictly 
increasing in the remarriage probabilities of the spouses. 
Denote the limits of (A, x) and 02 (八’ 1 - a;) as (0，x) and 02 (0,1 - x), 
respectively, when A approaches 0. Specifically, from above, 
,…、 似(0) ^ i M - ^ i ( ^ i ) “、 
诊 1 ( 0 ， � = 1 — h 咖 u ' l � (7) 
h n 1 T � 似 ( 0 ) U2(l - x) - U2(b2) 
Since it is shown that for sufficiently small A, it suffices to consider only the 
first and the fourth terms in because the second and the third terms 
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in r^{x) become large relative to the fourth and the first terms. As A -> 0, 
rA (x) converges to 
, � • / f (0, 1 - � ^ f 02 (0, 1 - X) 
Since the former term is strictly decreasing in x while the latter term is strictly 
increasing in x, there exists a unique generically stable convention x* as their 
unique intersection, i.e. 
( 0 2 ( O ， 1 - O � _ f 01 \ � 
恥 U 2 ( 0 ’ l - 小 i j _ U i (0,x*) + l； (y) 
Hence, x* is strictly increasing in ai but strictly decreasing in a2. Also, it 
follows from equations (7) and (8) that (f^  (0，•) is strictly decreasing in both 
•pi and hi for i = 1,2, so x* is strictly increasing in and bi but strictly de-
creasing in 'P2 and 62. The distribution within marriage is increasing relatively 
in the information, the probability of remarriage, and the share when being 
single of a partner. 
We are interested in the situation when the spouses have the same in-
formation, i.e. a\ = 02, so as to illustrate the difference in the remarraige 
probabilities would result in the different bargaining powers in the asymmetric 
Nash Bargaining Solution. 
T h e o r e m 2 When the spouses have the same information, the unique gener-
ically stable convention x* = {x\ 1 - x*) converges to the asymmetric Nash 
Bargaining Solution of the utility function {ui(-), U2(-)), the threat point (61,62)， 
and the power 1 — /?), i.e. x* 二 a rgmax (ui(x) — Ui(bi))^ . (u2(l - x ) -
U2[b2}y一�where 
1 - + (^ pi + St 
(1 + + 5e) + (1 - d + 印2 + Se) 
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Proof: When ai = a2, equation (9) becomes 
02 (0, 1 - X*) 二 01 (0乂） 
02 (0，1 - rc*) + 1 — 01 (0’:r*) + l 
h (0,1 - X*) 二 01 (0,x*) 
By equations (7) and (8)，it could be written explicitly as 
(W(0) U2(l - x ) - U2{b2) = U i ( x ) - U i { b i ) 
1 - 6 -^5p2 + Se 1^2(1 - x ) l - 6 - { - 6 p i - \ - 5 e u[{x) 
+ ,/2(1厂""）"、=(1_ “ 如 1 + 的 . ( 气 、 
U2{1 - x ) - ^ 2 ( 6 2 ) U i { x ) - U i [ b i ) 
which essentially gives x* is the asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution of the 
utility function (ui(.)’W2(.)), the threat point (61,62), and the power 
(1 - (5 + (5pi + ^e, 1 - 5 + 5p2 + 5e) 
It is possible to normalize the sum of the power into one, so it becomes 
1 - 5 + 6pi 6e 
卢 = ( 1 一 + + + (1 — + Sp2 + Se) 
From P, it is possible to derive the comparative statics of e on x*. 
Corrollary 1 When the spouses have the same information, the generically 
stable convention x* has the following properties 
1. ft > 1/2 if Pi > p2, vice versa 
( P i P2 61 62 e � 
2. The comparative statics on x* is 
乂 + — + - - if Pi > P2 
The generically stable division x* is still increasing relatively in the proba-
bility of remarriage, and the share when being single of a spouse. However, 
when the spouses have the same information, the different probabilities of 
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remarriage clearly play a decisive role to determine the distribution within 
marriage. When the remarriage probabilities are the same for the two classes, 
the spouses get an equal share of the marital surplus 1 - bi - 62. Otherwise, 
a spouse might get a larger share because of a higher remarriage probability. 
This is her bargaining power, which is not the same the choice of the "threat 
point" in the previously discussed bargaining models. Also, when p i � P 2 , 
since m would get a larger proportion of the martial surplus I — bi - 62, the 
risk of breakdown for compatible marriages e hurts m relatively more, so x* is 
decreasing in e. 
We further look into the situation where the spouses are sufficiently pa-
tient and the risk of breakdown for compatible marriages is close to zero, the 
power in the Nash Bargaining Solution converges to the ratio of the different 
probabilities of remarriage of the two spouses. Therefore, when divorce and 
remarriage are possible, the probability of remarriage is essential to study the 
distribution within marriage as a source of bargaining power. We conclude 
with the following theorem. 
T h e o r e m 3 <5 1 ande-^0, P converges to 
Proof: As (5 — 1 and e 0, 
^ 1 - (5 + + Pi 
/n • — •一 ‘ 一 + ‘ 
“ ( 1 - (5 + + 6e) + (1 - ^ + 5p'2 + (5e) pi + p2 
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5 Heterogeneous Popoluations 
In this section, we extend to heterogeneous popoluations. Rather than label-
ing agents with different information and degree of risk aversion as in Young 
(1993b), we explore the heterogeneity in the probability of remarriage. In a 
marriage market, it is possible to have some agents with more potential for 
remarriage than others due to economic and social reasons. We leave the dis-
cussion to Section 6. 
In our model, within a class, individuals could have diflfercnt probabilities 
of remarriage pi. Let 热 and p. be the maximum and the minimum proba-
bilities of remarriage in each class. We shall show that in the case of the 
same information of the two classes, the generically stable convention x* could 
also converge to an asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution. However, now the 
bargaining power (3 depends on p^ and p^ only. When the individuals are suf-
ficiently patitent, (3 becomes the ratio of and 节2-
The proof proceeds by considering rA(工)in Lemma 4. Since the individu-
als arc now with different remarriage probabilities within a class, the resistance 
might also depend on these probabilties. 
r / 02 (A, 1 - ^ ' ) \ . f 1 \ rA{x) = mill < min a? , . . . r—r ，mm a： . , , / a , , an ’ 
� ‘ \ P2 \(p2 (A, \ - x ) + \ J PI VI + 01 (niA,6i + A)y 
. ( 1 \ . / M A ^ X l 
T “2 ( l + 02(n2A,62 + A ) J U ( A , - ) + l J J 
Prom equations (5) and (6)，we know (pi (•，.) is decreasing in pi for i = 1,2. 
Hence, the first term is decreasing in p2 and the fourth term is decreasing in 
Pi ； while the second term is increasing in pi and the third term is increasing 
ill p2. Denote 而( .’ .)and 0. (•, •) be the functions 0,： (•, •) associated with p^  
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and p. respectively. Then, r^{x) becomes 
—2. 
, � • / ( 圣 2(八’ 1-工）A “ ( 1 ^ 
= mi 个(而(八，i_ 糾 ) ’ � 1 ( 1 + 么 (仏… ) J ， 
( 1 ^ f j i \ 1 
�1+么(722八，62 + A) 乂’ ai V0, (A,x) + 17 J 
It could be shown similarly that the second and the third terms become large 
relative to the fourth and the first terms for sufficiently small A. Since the first 
and the fourth terms now involve only (A, a;) and 02 (A, 1 - x), the limits 
in equations (7) and (8) now become 
CMU’：!；）- 1 —“碎 
： , n 1 、— 似W Ml — X) - U2(b2) 似U’ 丄-工J = Sc. u'2(l — x) 
As A -> 0, r^{x) converges to ro(x), where 
,、• / (而(o，i-^ A , ( 圣 1(0’工）M 
Likewise, since the former term is strictly decreasing in x while the latter term 
is strictly increasing in x, there exists a unique generically stable convention 
X* as their unique intersection, i.e. 
/ 02 (0,1 - X*) \ ( 圣 1 ( 0乂）� 
ao = = 0,1 
When the spouses have the same information, i.e. ai = o ^ � i t reduces to 
02 (0,1 — X*) = (pi (0’ X*). It could be written explicitly as 
6a'(0) U2(l - x) - U2(b2) _ Sa'jO) ui{x) - ui(bi) 
1 - (5 + + & ii'2(l - x) 二 
(1 — j +布 , / 2 ( l � — = (1 —J + J P i + c k ) . ,1 � 
> <^2(1 - re) - 1/2(62) Ui(l - x ) - U i ( 6 i ) 
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which essentially gives x* is the asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution of the 
utility function (Wi(.)’ii2(-))，the threat point (61,62), and the power 
(l-S + Sp^+Se,l-S-h 5p2 + 6e) 
By normalizing the sum of the power into one, the bargaining power /3 now 
only depends on pj and 节 2 � i . e . 
(1 - ^ + + + ( ! - ( ) ' + + 5e) 
Finally, as ^ 1 and e 0, For sufficiently patient spouses, the 
bargaining power converges to the ratio of the maximum remarriage probabil-
ities of each class, as the risk of breakdown for compatible marriages is close 
to zero. 
The result suggests the highest probability of remarriage in each class 
would shape the long run distribution within marriage. The reason is that 
the stochastic stability in the process is driven by those who have the low-
est resistance of moving from a convention to another. The individuals with 
a higher remarriage probability would be less resistive to over-demand than 
those with a lower remarriage probability, because they could return to another 
marriage relatively faster in case of dissolution due to incompatibility of de-
mands. Hence, the individuals who have the highest probability of remarriage 
ill each class would determine the long run distribution. This is analogous 
to Young (1993b), in which the decision of the most risk averse agent would 
shape the long run behaviour when the populations are heterogeneous in the 
degree of risk aversion in the utility functions. 
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6 Discussion 
This paper considers the common phenomena of divorce and remarriage to 
study the distribution within marriage. Evolutionary stability would favour 
an equilibrium in which the different probabilities of remarriage of the two 
spouses would become the source of their bargaining power. The spouse with 
a relatively higher probability of remarriage could get a larger distribution 
within marriage. When the populations are heterogeneous in the probability 
of remarriage, the "pioneers" with the highest remarriage probability in each 
class would decide the long rim distribution. 
According to Cherlin (1992), remarriage rates could vary greatly across 
gender and race. As mentioned in the Introduction, men are more likely to 
remarry than women. Moreover, remarriage is more common among whites 
than among blacks in the United States. Bumpass et. al (1990) suggest em-
pirical factors which remarriage rates might depend on the age at separation, 
the presence of children, and race. They find remarriages are about a quarter 
lower among women in their 30's at separation than among those in their 20's, 
and are two-thirds lower among women over age 40, It is suggested that the 
availability of potential partners and the "market position" would decrease as 
age increases, so it is less likely for older women to remarry. For the presence 
of children, Becker et. al (1977) show empirically children reduce the chances 
of remarriage of their mothers. The reason in their framework is that children 
are "capital" specific to a particular marriage, which would deter remarriage 
by increasing the financial costs and the cost of living in a step-family. White 
(1979) holds an alternative view that remarriage is more common for those 
women less capable of supporting themselves. Hence, they could obtain sup-
port financially and in the form of raising children. This could be a possible 
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reason for lower remarriage rates for blacks because their kin-network is larger 
and closer to provide support for mothers at separation. It is also possible that 
the social norms of marriage and remarriage arc specific to race. Since remar-
riage is less common in the previous generations among blacks than among 
white, this social norm has been maintained when their children "learn" from 
them. 
Ill our model, we haven't distinguished the possible differences in the nature 
of first marriages and remarriages. Conventional wisdom suggests remarrying 
individuals would learn from their divorces to better interact in the remar-
riages. However, the data in Cherlin (1992) show similar divorce rates for first 
rnarriageb and remarriages. A proportion of "first" remarriages would end in 
second divorces, followed by second remarriages. It is also likely the social 
norms would penalize first remarriages than second or third. Hence, these 




Proof of Lemma 3 
Following Young (1993b), it suffices to show there exists a positive integer N 
and a positive probability A, both independent of the generation t, such that 
from any initial state the probability of converging to a convention x within 
N generations is at least A. Thus the probability of not reaching a convention 
within cN generations is at most (1 - A , ’ which goes to 0 as c oo. 
Let M c M and F C F be the sets of m and f who sample at most half 
of the records. In other words, k == max{/ci，/c2} < 1/2. Suppose the process 
Pss' is in state s = 卜 ,+i’yM+i) ’ 卜 ' + 2 , ’ . . . ， a t generation 
t > /, there is a positive probability tt (m, f ) that m e M_ and f e F would be 
drawn to form a marriage partnership from generations t+l to t+/c inclusively. 
There is also a positive probability that each of these m's and / ' s would sample 
the same items of size ki and k? in s respectively. Let x and y be their best 
replies which are chosen with positive probabilties. Hence, there is a positive 
probability to obtain a run ( = ((a:, ？/), (a;, y ) , . . . , (x, y)) from generations t-\-l 
to t+k inclusively. It follows that from generations t+k+1 to t+2k inclusively, 
there is also a positive probability tt (m, f ) that m e K and f e F would be 
drawn to form a marriage partnership. Since all of these m's and / ' s would 
sample from their unique best replies are 1 — y and 1 - x respectively. This 
establishes another run = {{1 - y,l - x) - y,l - x),... - y,l - x)) 
from generations t k 1 to i + 2A; inclusively. In generation i + 2/c + 1, 
there is also a positive probability tt (m, / ) that m e M_ and f e F would be 
drawn to form a marriage partnership. There is a positive probability that 
m samples f r o m � ‘ w h i l e f samples from《，so their unique best replies are 
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X and \ — X respectively. In generation i + 2/c + 2, there is again a positive 
probability tt (m, f ) that m e M_ and / G F would be drawn to form a mar-
riage partnership. With a positive probability, m samples f r o m w h i l e f 
samples from the most recent k - 1 records f r o m � a n d the record of genera-
tion ( + 2/c + 1, so their uniqe best replies are still x and 1 - x respectively. 
Continuing in this manner, there is a positive probability to obtain another 
run {(x, 1 - x) - x ) . . - x)) for I generations in succession, i.e. 
Pss' converges to the convention x. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 4 
Suppose the process is now in convention x, the marriage is compatible, we 
want to compute the least number of intial mistakes x' ^ x made by m's or 
I — x' ^ 1 — X made by / ' s , which lead to a deviation by their partners from 
1 — X or X respectively. 
By Lemma 1 (ii), for i = 1,2, Wi (x + nA, 1 - x) = Wi (x, 1 - x + nA) for 
any positive integer n, because the degree of incompatibility is the same of riA 
units. By Lemma 1 (iii), Wi (x, 1 - a:) is independent of a: for i = 1,2. So 
, N 、 / 1 、 <5g(x+nA,l-x) bt Wi [X + nA, 1 - X) - Wi[X,l — X) — -x) 
1-Wi{x,l- x) 1 -
••• d{x-{- nA, 1 - x) = a{nA) + e 
(?£+(?a(nA) i^ e 
= 1 - & 
_ 6a{nA) 
_ 1 - 5 + 咖 + + 5a{nA) 
Hence, we could obtain for z = 1,2 
Wi (x + nA, 1 - x) - Wi{x,l - x) _ 6a{nA) 
1-Wiix,l- x) — l - S + Spi-i-Sc + Sa{nA) 
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Wi \ — X nA) - Wi {x, 1 - rr) _ 5a{nA) 
1-Wi{x,l- x) _ 1 - d’ + 彻 + & + 6 a ( n A ) ( ) 
Case 1: x' < X 
(i) Suppose f samples i instances of mistake x' and ail — i instances of x, 
remain at 1 - a; : U2 {x, 1 - x) 
switch to l - x ' : 志 1 - a;') + 1 - ^ U2 {x, 1 - x') 
Hence, 1 - is the best reply if 
� U 2 (x, l - x ) - U2 (x, 1 - x') 
^ - U2 l - x ' ) - U2 (x, 1 - x') 
W2 (X, 1 - X) U2(b2) + [1 - W 2 (X, 1 - X)]li2(l — x)' 
-[w2 (x, 1 - x') 1^ 2(62) -\-\l-W2 (x, 1 — — x), 
W2 1 — X') U2(b2) ^-[l-W2 1 — x')]u2{l — x') 
-[W2 (X, 1 — X') ^2(62) + [1 - (a：, 1 — X')]U2{1 - X) 
Using Lemma 1 (iii), w�(x, 1 - x) = W2 1 - x'). Hence, 
W2 (x, 1 - x) 1x2(62) -\-ll-w2 (x, 1 - - x) 
i -IW2 (x, 1 - x') “2(62) + II-W2 (x, 1 - X')]U2{1 - x) 
匆'- IW2 (x, 1 - x) U2{h2) + [1 - (x, 1 — X)]U2(1 _ x')] 
-[W2 (X, 1 - 2；') U2(b2) + [1 — (X, 1 — — x)] 
— W2 (x, 1 - x') - W2 (x, 1 - a:)][^2(l _ I ) — U2(b2) 
[W2 (X, 1 — X' ') — W'l (X, 1 — X)][u2il - X ) - 112(1)2): 
+ [1 - W2 (X, 1 - :C)][W2(1 — X') - W2(l - X) 
W2{x,l-x')-W2 (x,l-x) . U2(1-‘T)-U2(62) — 1-W2ix,l-X) U2il-X')-U2{l-X) 
W2{x,l—x')-W2{x,l-x) U2{l-x)—U2[b2) i 丄 
Let X — x' = nA, this condition becomes 
^ l-tt;2(x,l-x) ‘ U2(l_a:+nA)-U2(l-:r) 
CLql _ u'2(x,l-x+nA)-tt;2(x,l-x) . U2{l-x)-U2{b2) , ^ l-W2{x,l-x) •U2(l-a;+nA)-U2(l-.'c) 
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dajnA) _ U2(l_aO-U2(fr2) 
_ 1-占+6p2+(5e+(?a(nA) ‘ •U2(l-x+nA)-U2(l--i：) i /•, -. \ 
- 5a(nA) U 2 ( l - a O — i i ^ � ^ l-5+<5p2+5e+5a(nA) ‘ U2(l-a;+nA)-U2(l-x) 
02 (nA, 1 - x) + 1 n / 
Since it is assumed that 02 (nA, 1 - a;) is increasing in n, the RHS is increasing 
in n. Hence, the minimum of i occurs when x' = x — A, i.e. n = 1 
. � / Y f 02 (A, 1 -
I > I X a2 -~7-r—; r 
This is the first term of rA (工). 
(ii) Suppose m samples j instances of mistake \ - x' and a:l - j instances of 
1 — X, 
remain at x :杰t/i (x, 1 - x') + 1 - ^ Ui {x, 1 — x) 
switch to x' : U\ {x', 1 - x') 
Hence, x' is the best reply if 
2 _ � I h {x, l - x ) - U , 1 - x') 
- Ui (x, l - x ) - U i { x , l - x') 
Wi (x, l-x)ui(6i) + [1 — (x, 1 一 x)]ui(工)： 
-[wi {x', 1 - x') Ui(bi) + [1 - l^；! 1 -
Wi {x, 1 - x)ui(bi) + [1 - tiJi (a:, 1 - x)]ui{x)' 
-[wi (x, 1 - x') Ui(bi) + ll-Wi {x, 1 - 0；')]141(工')] 
Using L e m m a 1 (iii), Wi {x, 1 — ic) 二 (x', 1 - x'). Hence, 
j � [1 - wi (x, 1 - a;)][ii(i；) - ui{x') 
ail 一 [ l - w i ( a ; , l - u i M ： 
(X, - Wi (x, 1 - - Ui(bi)' 
_ 1 
— 1 , wi(x,i-xO-uji(x,i-x) • m(xO-m(6i) 丄十 l-u;i(x,l-x) • Ul(x)-Ul(x') 
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Let 工—rc' 二 nA, this condition becomes 
j 1 > 
Q I — 1 I wi(x,l-x+nA)-wi(x,l-x) . ui(x-nA)-ui(bi) 丄 l -u; i (x , l -x ) ui{x)-ui{x-nA) 
= 1 6a{nA) m(x-nA)-uT(M ^^ ⑴） 
丄十 l-(5+dpi+<5f+(5a(nA) • ui(x)-ui(x-nA) 
= 1 + 01 ( n A , x - n A ) ^^ � 
Since it is assumed that {nA,x - nA) is increasing in n, the RHS is de-
creasing in n. Hence, the minimum of j occurs when x' = bi A, i.e. n = n^ 
f 1 \ 
… X a i + 公 1 (niA’6i + A )J 
This is the second term of r^ ix) . 
Case 2: x' > x 
(i) Suppose f samples i instances of mistake x' and ail - i instances of x, 
remain at 1 - x : (x', 1 - x) + 1 - ^ U2 (x, 1 - x) 
switch to 1 - x' : U2 (工'’ 1 — 
Hence, 1 - is the best reply if 
丄 � I h (x, l - x ) - U 2 (工‘’ 1 - x') 
Wl ~ U2 {x, l-x)-U2 1 - x) 
[W2 {X, 1 一 X) ^2(62) + [l-W2 {X, 1 - X)]W2(1 — 
-[W2 1 — X')u2(b2) + {l-W2 1 一 — x'), 
W2 (X, 1 - X) ^ 2(62) + [1 - W2 (X, 1 — X)]U2(1 - X)' 
- W 2 1 — X) 1X2(62) -\-[l-W2 (x', 1 — X)]U2{1 — X') 
Using Lemma 1 (iii), W2 (x, 1 - x) = W2 1 - x'). Hence, 
i � [1 - W2 (x, 1 - X)][U2{1 - x ) - U2(l - x')] 
a“ 一 11-W2 {X, 1 - X)][U2{1 -X)- U2{1 - X')] 
-\-[W2 1 - X) - W2(X,1 - X)]IU2{1 - X')—以2似: 
39 
_ 1 
1 , 2^(不'，1一3：)—"0；2(0：，1_0：) • U2(l-X')~"U2(b2) 
Let — X = nA, this condition becomes 
上 〉 i 
d^l _ 1 I W2ix+nA,l-x)-W2{x,l-x) U2(l-x+nA)-U2(^ 2) ‘ 丄 l-u;2(x,l-x) • U2(l-a:)-U2(l-a:+nA) 
= 1 I dajnA) —U2(l-x+nA)-U2(62) ^^ (10) 
= by (5) 
1 + 02 (nA, 1 - X — nA) )�乂 
Since it is assumed that (nA, 1 — re — nA) is increasing in n, the RHS is 
decreasing in n. Hence, the minimum of i occurs when x' = 1 — 62 — A, i.e. 
n = 712 , ( 1 \ 
i > I X 0/2 ；~：—— ；tT — Vl + 02 (n2A,62 +A)； 
This is the third term of r^{x). 
(ii) Suppose m samples j instances of mistake 1 - x' and ail - j instances of 
1 - x, 
remain at x : Ui {x, 1 - x) 
switch to x':杰^(:c'’l — 0 + [1-击 Ui 1 - x) 
Hence, x' is the best reply if 
丄 � U i (x, l -x)-Ui 1 - :r) 
^ - Ui 1 - x ' ) - Ui - x ) 
u'l {x, 1 — x)ui{bi) - wi (x, 1 — x)]ui{x)' 
-{-[wi 1 - x) ui{bi) + [1 - u^ i 1 - x)]ui{x)' 
wi (x', 1 - x') ui{bi) + [1 - (x\ 1 - x')]ui{x')] 
1 {x', 1 - a;) ui{bi) + [1 - 1 -
Using Lemma 1 (iii), W2 (x, 1 - x) = W2 1 — x'). Hence, 2 _ � U i (x, l -x)-U, jx', 1 — x) 
ail - Ui 1 - a;') - 1 - a;) 40 
wi (x, \ - x) ui{bi) + [1 - uii (x, 1 - a;)]iii(a:)] 
•i-[wi (x'', 1 - x)u-[(6i) + [1 - wi 1 - (x)' 
wi {x, 1 - x) ui{bi) + [1 - lUi (x, 1 — 
-\-[wi 1 - x)ui(6i) + [1 - 1 — x)]ui[x] 
_ wi 1 - a:)][iii(a:) - ui{bi) 
wi (x', 1 - — ui{bi)] 
+[1 - Wi (a:, 1 — — 
u，i(a:'’l-:r) . ui{x)-ui{bi) 
l-H)l(x,l-x) Ul{x')-U\{x) — u^^x'.l-x) • Ui{x)-Uiibi) + 1 
1-'u;i(x,1-.t) ui(x')-ui(x) 
Let x' — X = nA, this condition becomes 
. w\ (x+nA,l-a:) ui(x)-ui(6i) 
"I 、 l-tt;i(x,l-x) ui(x+nA)-ui(x) 
( I J — wi(a:+nA,l-x) , u i (x)-m(bi ) , 丄 
Sn{nA) . U]{x)-u\{b\) 
— l-(?+<5pi+(?£+^a(nA) ‘ m (x+nA)-m(x) i 门⑴ 
= M " A ) m ( x ) - m ( 6 i ) 丨 u y l-^u； 
l-(5+5pi+<S£+(5a(nA) • ui(x+nA)-ui ( x )卞 
Since it is assumed that (nA, x) is increasing in n, the RHS is increasing in 
n. Hence, the minimum of j occurs when x' = x + A, i.e. n = 1 
.、， Z M A ^ X 
J > I X ai , , • — 、 , 1 
This is the fourth term of 
Therefore, r^{x) takes the minimum of these four terms. 
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